The starting point of the discussion on the rules of nationality does not refer so much to nationality as such but to a more fundamental issue, namely the question of whose rights are asserted when bringing an international claim. Traditional rules on diplomatic protection undertaken by the State are confronted in this context with the increasing access of the individual to dispute settlement mechanisms.
The classic rule on the matter was well established in the
Mavrommatis
concessions case, where the Permanent Court of
International Justice ruled that " [b] y taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights -its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law". As rightly explained by Bennouna, this conceptual approach led to a "transformation" of the claim, which passed from the individual to the spousing State of nationality, but in so doing the role of the State became paramount and eclipsed that of the individual which was at its origin. 3 A number of consequences followed from this legal fiction which responded to the time when the State was the single and most important subject of international law. Discretionary spousal of claims, disposition of the compensation by the State, introduction of a type of damage different from that suffered by the individual, and the influence of political power are some of those consequences. 4 A number of legal contradictions accompanied this approach since its outset. First, in cases where a direct injury to the State could be established international law provided for different rules of protection, such as measures of self-protection. 5 This included situations in which the affected individual was a high officer of the State. 6 The requirement of the continuity of nationality of the affected individual also involved a contradiction since " [i] t is also illogical to consider the State as the sole holder of the international claim, yet at the same time to prevent the State from pursuing this claim because the 'nationality' of the underlying individual claim has changed". 7 More importantly, while diplomatic protection was understood as the "procedural corollary to the legal responsibility of international law subjects" 8 , in many instances it does not appear to have followed the evolution that the law of state responsibility itself has experienced, particularly in respect of the operation of international mechanisms established to make states answerable to international wrongs. 9 Besides the legal issues involved in this approach, there was a clear political connotation in the use of diplomatic protection as an instrument of power by States in international relations.
10
Reactions such as the "Calvo Clause", aimed at the elimination of the role of diplomatic protection, were the inevitable consequence of the abuse of this form of protection in the early part of the twentieth century.
Legal and political issues, however, were not enough to prevent the consolidation of the classic rules on the matter, 11 nor did considerations of equity and logic have much influence on State practice for a long period of time.
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But this discussion also reveals that various issues appear not to have met the required standards of support by state practice and opinio juris so as to become a rule of customary international law. One thing was the European and United States practice on diplomatic protection, but quite another was the view taken by many other countries that did not share the same legal understandings in this respect.
It would be the very structure of international law that prompted fundamental changes in the role of diplomatic protection. As the State lost its position of exclusivity in the international legal order, and both international organizations and individuals acquired specific, albeit still limited roles of their own, new alternatives emerged for the assertion of international claims. The law of human rights, on the one hand, and that relating to the protection of foreign investments, on the other hand, have opened up a clear path for the direct access of the individual to international mechanisms for the assertion of claims, following a number of specific precedents established along the twentieth century.
13
This trend is also present in a number of other developments taking place under contemporary international law in respect of the settlement of disputes.
14 In this new context, many times it is the right of the individual affected and no longer that of the State of nationality which is asserted. To that same extent, diplomatic protection is no longer required to intervene and, furthermore, as in ICSID, it is expressly excluded to the extent that arbitration is resorted to and complied with.
The direct standing of the individual under international law will continue to expand for a variety of purposes, particularly in terms of access to dispute settlement mechanisms.
15
It can therefore be expected that claims will be increasingly handled aside from the operation of diplomatic protection. This does not mean that the role of the State has lost its significance. It will still be necessary to spouse claims in the many areas where direct standing is not available, to enter into treaties and arrangements to ensure such direct access, to establish the legal framework under which individuals will operate and to make available its own judicial and administrative remedies for nationals and foreigners alike.
5
The essence of the evolution points towards the fact that in both the scenario of diplomatic protection and in that of direct standing of the individual, it is increasingly the right of the individual that is asserted in its own merits and no longer that of the sponsoring State.
The State may still act as a conduit, an agent or on behalf of the individual, but no longer in substitution of his rights. This is not to say that the State may not consider that a wrong done to one of its nationals affects its own interest, but the latter will be the consequence of the rights of the individual and not the State's own right. While the transition from a legal fiction to a different reality takes place, the interesting thought that a claim may actually have a "dual nature" and represent the interest of both the individual and the state has been advanced. 16 Because the protection of human rights has advanced significantly under contemporary international law, the argument that this area of the law is different from that relating to diplomatic protection has also been suggested. 17 In this context diplomatic protection would rather be kept for the safeguard of the economic interests of the individual. While historically diplomatic protection has encompassed both the economic interests and the treatment of individuals abroad, it is quite true that the law of human rights has evolved beyond the framework of traditional diplomatic protection, following more liberal rules and allowing even for claims against the State of nationality. But it is also true that the same path is being followed by other areas of the law typically relating to economic interests, such as the case of investments, thereby evidencing that the evolution is not so much related to the nature of the rights but to the institution of diplomatic protection as a whole. Furthermore, economic rights are also considered today to be a part of human rights, 2.-Alternatives to traditional diplomatic protection.
While the historic legal fiction underlying diplomatic protection might no longer always be necessary or justified, the key question, as has been aptly put by Lady Fox, seems to be which is the alternative solution to the traditional requirements of diplomatic protection.
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The existing system has the advantage of an orderly administration of claims by the State of nationality, including the handling of multiple claims, the availability of diplomatic channels for negotiations and settlement, and the intervention of that State in the implementation of legal rules.
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The disadvantages noted are also quite evident, particularly in terms of the political elements intervening in the governmental decision to spouse or not to spouse a claim, and the full discretionary nature that this decision has.
The option of abolishing diplomatic protection as a mechanism under international law, while justified in the context of specific treaty regimes, does not seem to be generally a reasonable one at present since it would leave many individuals unprotected or left to their own action.
A residuary role for diplomatic protection seems more adequate to the extent that this mechanism might only intervene when there are no international procedures directly available to the affected individual. One other aspect that needs to be considered in the context of alternative options is how to ensure that the element of discretion in the governmental decision to spouse a claim is to some extent subject to a legal scrutiny. On many occasions a government will simply refuse to accept the individual's request to have a claim spoused and no remedies will be available to this effect. An interesting historical solution to this problem is found in the Chilean legislation of the nineteenth century, where the request for diplomatic protection would be sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Advocate General (Fiscal) of the Supreme Court for a legal opinion that was binding on the government. 22 Might a solution of this sort be adopted as an obligation under international law in the context of due process? It has been also noted that since the claiming State had discretion as to the distribution of compensation, it could make payments to persons who did not meet the requirement of nationality.
28
A declaration of intention to acquire the nationality of the claiming State has also been considered enough to spouse the claim.
Claims on behalf of non-nationals have not been unknown in the practice of international law. 29 Citizens of the European Unity are entitled to diplomatic and consular protection by the authorities of any member State in the territory of a third country in which the State of his nationality is not represented, although this type of protection is related more to consular or diplomatic assistance in situ than to the possibility of presenting an international claim. 
Under the rules of the United Nations Compensation
Commission, a government may submit claims on behalf of its nationals and "at its discretion, of other persons resident in its territory". 37 The latter are evidently not its nationals but only its residents, and may have the nationality of other State. 38 Trusteeship arrangements are also used to extend protection to persons who are not in a position to have their claims submitted by a Government; under the United Nations Compensation Commission rules a person, authority or body may be appointed to this effect by the Governing Council. 39 The second situation that must be considered is that not always the spousal of the State of nationality is required to submit a claim. Also under the Rules of the UNCC, a corporation whose State of incorporation has failed to submit a claim on its behalf, may itself make a claim to the Commission, explaining why such claim was not submitted by a government. The situations examined evidence that the link of nationality has lost to an extent its rigor in the context of international claims. Moreover, to the extent that the intervention of the State is reduced or eliminated as a requirement for submission of international claims, the link of nationality will loose somewhat its relevance. This is particularly so in the field of human rights and related humanitarian concerns, where as noted direct access by the individual to international procedures is not only increasingly available but can also be exercised against his own State of nationality. While these trends cannot be taken to mean that the traditional requirements have been overturned, they certainly point towards a situation of greater flexibility and adaptation to changing needs.
4.-Continuance of nationality.
A second well established rule in respect of diplomatic protection is that of continuance of nationality. As proposed by Garcia Amador, the individual may be protected on condition that it possesses the nationality of the spousing State "at the time of sustaining the injury and conserves that nationality until the claim is adjudicated". 47 The continuance of nationality until the presentation of the claim has also been considered to meet the requirement of this rule, 48 an approach that seems to be favored by State practice. The need for stability and certainty might be ensured if the affected individual is given a choice that it could be either the State of nationality at the time of the critical date or that of a later nationality that could spouse his claim, since in both cases the State will be acting on behalf of the individual. It has also been suggested that only the "new" home State should be able to bring a claim but not the previous one. The strict retention of the rule of continuance of nationality does not seem to find any longer justification in the light of the changing role of nationality as a requirement of diplomatic protection. There is here a need to revise or at any rate to adjust the operation of the rule to this new reality, a situation that becomes still more evident in the context of the transfer of rights and claims that will be discussed next.
5.-Transferability of claims.
As a consequence of the rule set out above, also the continuance of nationality has been generally required in respect of the transferability or assignability of claims. To this end, transfer of claims could only be done between persons having the same nationality of the spousing State. This has been the approach to questions such as succession on death, assignment, insurance subrogation and other. 60 However, again here the question of whether this rule is always justified in the light of a new approach to diplomatic protection and the enforcement of claims must be asked. If the right of the individual prevails, it would seem enough that the right to a claim be established at a critical date and changes of nationality intervening thereafter in the context of transfers or assignment should not be a bar to bringing a claim at some point in time.
To some extent this situation was recognized in claims to property beneficially owned by one person, the nominal title to which is vested in another person of a different nationality; it was usually the nationality of the former that prevailed for the purposes of claims.
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The question is still more relevant in the insurance business, where the rights of the insured may pass to the insurer by way of subrogation.
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The continuance of nationality is probably not any longer justified in the light of a global market of insurance, in which insured and insurer will often have different nationalities. Investment insurance, such as that available under OPIC or MIGA, is also based on subrogation of rights. 63 Although the traditional rule on this point is still regarded as accepted, there are solid grounds justifying departure from it in given matters, or in any event for introducing the necessary flexibility. The globalization of financial and service markets will probably require such a departure. In fact, the application of the traditional rule in the context of globally structured financial markets where shares, bonds and other instruments change hands, and consequently nationality, constantly and speedily, can only be regarded as an anachronism that could amount in given instances to deprive legitimate owners and investors of protection on the part of States of nationality. In a recent ICSID case the question of international transfer of promissory notes was considered and the rules protecting a foreign investor as the transferee were upheld by the Tribunal in the light of the nature of global markets. 64 To the extent that the requirement of continuance of nationality might be moderated in this context, it might be appropriate to ensure that transfer of claims be made bona fide so as to prevent that a claim be transferred to a national of a stronger State in order to strengthen diplomatic protection, a concern that has been often expressed. Although it has been suggested that these rules probably reflect customary international law, 68 the situation does not appear today to be quite consolidated. 69 In fact, it has been shown above that in a number of cases diplomatic protection has been exercised in respect of nationals of the defendant State or in respect of other non-nationals. The possibility that a State might accept by treaty the obligation to provide to all persons within its jurisdiction, regardless of nationality, a standard of protection required by that treaty has also been envisaged, a situation in which the issues of nationality will again loose significance, as happens often in treaties of economic integration or trade liberalization. 70 To the extent that these situations might reflect a trend, then the case explained in (i) above will also be opened to a greater degree of flexibility. The same holds true of the situation considered in (ii) above since here the closer connection is given with the claimant State, having this departure from the rule been accepted in international decisions. 71 In (iii) and (iv) the issue concerns a dual nationality involving a third State. Here again the rules explained rely on the effectiveness of the nationality link, based on which criteria they point to different answers. However, if flexibility of the rule or departure from it is allowed in cases involving the dual nationality of the respondent State, with every more reason this should the case of dual nationality involving third States.
Also when the person has direct access to international claims the situation has been compared to that of a claim involving a dual nationality with a third State, so that the Tribunal may take into account the principle of "effective nationality". 72 The practice of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the dissenting views expressed in that context, offer interesting insights into the new issues and problems relating to the rules on dual nationality. 73 The joint action by two States of nationality in respect of a third State has also been suggested as an alternative when both are willing to extend their diplomatic protection to the affected individual.
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Two trends seem to emerge from the above discussion. The first is that the traditional rules of the 1930 Convention are being applied with a greater degree of flexibility, which will become particularly marked in connection with the approach to diplomatic protection relying on the rights of the individual as the prevailing element. The second trend is that in this context, like in other matters pertaining to nationality, effectiveness offers an important guiding tool, particularly for decisions of tribunals. Criteria to evaluate effectiveness will depend on the circumstances of each case, where residence, family ties, property, taxation and many other elements will determine the "stronger social bond of attachment". These additional criteria have been rightly described not as conferring nationality, but as creating an equivalent connection 78 which on occasions is considered to provide enough ground for the exercise of diplomatic protection. 79 Questions of effectiveness of the connection will also arise in this context, particularly when a corporation having the nationality of the State of incorporation is owned by non-nationals of that State.
One of the most problematic aspects of the matter was that submitted to the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction case, 80 as to the right of a State to protect shareholders of its nationality in a foreign corporation affected by measures of a third State.
While the dictum of the Court was in the negative and the right to diplomatic protection was recognized only in respect of the State of incorporation, criticism of this decision and subsequent practice evidence that the question was not really settled at the time.
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A number of earlier precedents were also invoked but were considered by the Court to be rather exceptions to the rule upheld.
82
Some of this criticism has been based on the fact that the Court applied a too rigid standard "owing to an exaggerated fear of competing claims, thus neglecting the economic realities and leaving the real losers without protection".
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As to the practice, it should be noted first that the Court itself recognized that a State may protect its shareholders in a foreign corporation when they have their rights as such directly infringed, independently from damage inflicted upon the company. Most importantly, it is provided that shareholders of a corporation which is barred from making a claim because of its nationality, may claim for the losses with respect to that corporation.
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In the case of a partnership which has a separate legal personality and which because of its nationality is ineligible to claim for its losses, each of the eligible partners may claim pro rata for his proportionate interest; 102 a similar rule is followed for partners in a partnership which has no separate legal personality. 103 Questions of nationality of corporations are compounded in their difficulty when the corporation has a multinational character, allowing eventually for a number of States to act on its behalf, a situation which is every passing day more common in a globalized economy. The concept of control and of prevalent nationality is also useful in this context so as to determine the prevailing national interest in the capital of the company, what would eventually allow for action by the State holding the greater interest or establish an order of priority to this effect.
International registration of such companies would also be a helpful measure to overcome problems of concurrent nationalities, as it is done in respect of trademarks or has been proposed in respect of a "societas europaea". 2.-The discretion exercised by a government in refusing to spouse a claim on behalf of the individual might be appropriately subject to judicial review in the context of due process. While some of these aspects are already a part of current arrangements for dispute settlement, other seem to be emerging as prospective trends. As international dispute settlement develops in the years ahead the law and practice relating to the requirements of nationality is likely to be one of those areas where major changes can be expected.
